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PROBLEMS OF PERFORMANCE OF SALES CONTRACTS
UNDER JAPANESE AND AMERICAN LAW
KATSURO KANZAXI* and WILIAM C. JONES**
I. INTRODUCTION
This article will discuss the problem of performance of contracts for
the sale of goods (personal property) under American and Japanese
law. The discussion of American law will be limited almost entirely to
the Uniform Commercial Code.' Excluded from this discussion are
risk of loss, impossibility and frustration, and products liability; these
topics are treated elsewhere in this symposium.
Given such a task, it is unfortunate that it is so difficult to say quite
what "performance" means in this context. It clearly does not mean
what laymen-the parties to the contract-would think, namely the
process of delivering and paying for the goods. Lawyers are rarely
concerned with the actual operation of contracts for the sale of goods.
Businessmen are unlikely to seek lawyers' advice-as they might, for
example, in the case of tax or anti-trust problems--concerning just
what sort of goods they should furnish under a particular sales con-
tract. Rather, the lawyer is called upon only after unsatisfactory per-
formance has been rendered or after satisfactory performance has
become unlikely. In other words, the lawyer is usually sought after
breach or repudiation (or contemplated breach or repudiation when
it is a party who has yet to perform who seeks the lawyer's advice).
If a lawyer is engaged in the transaction, it normally will be only at
the time of formation or breach. He does not deal with satisfactory
performance at all. He is concerned with unsatisfactory performance
only after it has taken place.
To be sure, the commercial codes of both the United States and
Japan contain a number of rules which look as though they are
designed to deal with performance, such as when goods are to be
delivered, how payment is to be made, and whether the buyer may
*Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Kobe University. LL.B., 1961, Kobe
University.
** Professor of Law, Washington Univ. (St. Louis); A.B. 1946, Yale Univ.; LL.B.
1949, Harvard Univ.; LL.M. 1959, J.S.D. 1961, Univ. of Chicago.1 All references to the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter UCCI are to
Uxnoi~s CoMMERcIAL CODE 1962 OFFICIL, TEXT WITH COMMENTS. The UCC has
been enacted in all the United States except Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi,
and South Carolina. U.C.C. REP. Corrolation Tables (Pike & Fischer ed. 1966).
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inspect. But these rules can only be understood if seen in the context
of the principle which underlies both American and Japanese sales
law: the parties are free to arrange almost everything they wish in
their contract. There is almost total freedom of contract." It is usually
only when the parties have failed to specify some matter that the code
rules apply. Consequently the code rules are best regarded as pre-
sumptions of the parties' intention. So, for example, if at the time they
made the contract the parties said nothing about where delivery was to
take place, a code rule may provide that delivery will be at the seller's
place of business. But if there is any evidence of a contrary intention,
such intention will govern. This can lead to rather strained interpreta-
tions, of course, since often the parties have no thought whatever about
a particular matter when they are contracting, and certainly they do
not ordinarily think about what the legal rules might be. (They prob-
ably think more about price than anything else.) It is necessary, how-
ever, to have some sort of standard of performance in order to decide
how the parties might have deviated from it-to see whether there is a
breach. Both the United States and Japanese sales codes provide such
standards in the form of rules for performance which are subject to
contrary agreement.'
2 Almost every section in UCC article 2 (Article on Sales) is qualified by "un-
less otherwise agreed." See Jones, Back to Contract, 1964 WAsHa. U.L.Q. 143. Sim-
ilarly, article 91 of the Japanese Civil Code (which also has application in com-
mercial transactions) provides: "If the parties to a juristic act have declared an
intention which differs from any provisions of laws or ordinances which are not
concerned with public policy, such intention shall prevail." [This translation, and
those of the Civil Code provisions which follow, are taken from 2 Eibun hareisha
Law Bulletin Series [hereinafter EHS] No. 2100 (1966.)]
' There is, of course, a considerable difference in the attitudes of the courts of the
two countries towards the interpretation of contracts, at least in theory. In the
United States the courts purport not to "make" (or remake) contracts "for the
parties," but only to interpret whatever the parties have agreed to. If the contract
is invalid or unenforceable, then the court will not make any effort to change it-
indeed it does not have the power to do so. Of course, the power of courts to "inter-
pret" contracts can easily lead to what is, in effect, a reconstruction of the contract.
Still the attitude of American courts is much influenced by this doctrine.
The situation in Japan is quite different. The courts are much freer to remake
the contract. The principal authority is Japanese Civil Code article 1:
(1) All private rights shall conform to the public welfare.
(2) The exercise of rights and performance of duties shall be done in faith
and in accordance with the principles of trust.
(3) No abusing of rights is permissible.
and also article 1-2: "This Code shall be construed from the standpoint of the
dignity of individuals and the essential equality of the sexes." To an American ear
this sounds too general to be of much practical importance, but like a similar pro-
vision, German Civil Code (BGB) article 242, it has served as the basis of very
important developments.
In a case where the intention of the parties is not clear, the contract should be
interpreted in the light of business practice. (This is, of course, the same as UCC
§ 1-205.) When some parts of the contract are illegal or unjust, this should not cause
the invalidity of the entire contract. Rather, the court should, where possible, re-
F VOL. 42 : 415
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II. RULES FOR DELIVERY AND PAYMENT
A. In the United States
The contract provisions for performance, which the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (hereinafter UCC) will presume in the absence of indica-
tion of a contrary intent by the parties, are quite orthodox. Thus, the
UCC provides that, absent agreement to the contrary, delivery must be
in single lots.4 However, where a contract provides expressly or
impliedly for several shipments and not just one, it is presumed in the
UCC that separate payments will be made for each shipment.' Deliv-
ery is to be at the seller's place of business-or if he has none, at his
residence-unless the contract is for the sale of identified goods which
are somewhere else at the time, in which case delivery will be at that
place.6 If no time is specified, then delivery is to be within a "reason-
able time."7 Payment is due at the time and place the buyer is to
receive the goods, and only there.' To be entitled to payment, the
seller must tender delivery9 at a reasonable hour.10 These presump-
tions apply in cases where there is nothing to indicate that the seller
is to ship the goods, and therefore many domestic sales (perhaps most
of the large ones) and almost all overseas sales are not covered by the
foregoing presumptions.
In any case where the seller is required or authorized to ship the
goods-and whether he is or not will be inferred from the contract and
attendant circumstances (no set form is required)-the seller has not
performed satisfactorily merely by making goods available at his place
of business. Once it is determined that the seller is so required or
place the offending provisions with substitute provisions that are reasonable and in
accordance with business practice and good faith.
The situation of changed arcumstances is dealt with similarly in Japan. See
Igarashi & Rieke, Impossibility and Frustration in Sales Contracts, 42 WASH. L.
REv. 445 (1967). If the situation on the basis of which the contract was made
changes markedly, it is said that the contract no longer has the power to bind the
parties to its original content, and the obligation should be modified to accommodate
the changed circumstances, or the party injured by the change should be given the
right to rescind the contract. Four elements are necessary for the application of this
rule: (1) the occurrence of a great change in the situation; (2) the unforeseeability
of this change; (3) neither party must be responsible for the change; and (4) it
would be contrary to the rule of bona fides to permit the parties to remain bound by
the contract in its original form. See 1 WAGATSUMA, SAIKEN KAKURON (Detailed
enplanation of obligations) 25 (1962).
'UCC § 2-307. Of course circumstances may alter this. See id. at comments 2 & 3.
UCC § 2-307.
UCC § 2-308.7 UCC § 2-309(1).
8 UCC § 2-310 (a).9 UCC § 2-507(1).
" UCC § 2-503 (1) (a).
1967]
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authorized, the UCC makes a distinction between "shipment" and
"destination" contracts. Under the former, which is the more usual
situation, the seller is obligated (absent contrary agreement) to per-
form by putting the goods in the possession of the carrier, making a
"reasonable" contract for shipment, and arranging matters so that the
buyer can obtain possession of the goods, including prompt notification
to the buyer." Thus, in a contract for the sale of 10,000 radios by
a Japanese manufacturer to an American dealer under term "F.O.B.
Yokohama," delivery to the carrier in Yokohama essentially completes
the seller's performance. If a particular carrier has not been specified,
then under the UCC whatever is reasonable under the circumstances-
probably delivery to any reputable shipping company--would do. 2
On the other hand, if the transaction had involved a "destination"
contract, delivery to the carrier would not have satisfied the seller's
performance obligations. Thus, in the example above if the term had
been "F.O.B. New York," the Japanese seller would be obliged to
tender delivery in New York.' 3 Under such circumstances no particu-
lar rules are needed to guide the seller's performance; he can be
counted on to make such arrangements as are necessary to make ten-
der, since he bears the risk of loss until proper tender has been made. 4
It should be pointed out that the UCC has a number of more
detailed provisions on certain aspects of delivery. They are included
in a number of definitions of commonly used commercial terms, but
all are subject to contrary agreement. 5
B. In Japan
The provisions of the Japanese codes are not greatly different. Thus,
in the case of both commercial and non-commercial contracts for the
sale of specified goods, delivery is to be made at the place where the
goods are located when the contract is made.'6 If the goods are
- UCC § 2-504.
UCC § 2-504, comment 3. It might be noted that the risk of loss passes to the
buyer at this point. UCC § 2-509(1) (a).
UCC §§ 2-319(1), 2-503.
"UCC §2-509 (1) (b).
'
5 E.g., UCC § 2-319 defines various F.O.B. and F.A.S. terms; §§ 2-320 and 2-321
define C.I.F. and C. & F.; § 2-322 defines delivery "ex-ship"; § 2-323 deals with forms
of bills of lading in overseas shipment; §2-324 deals with "no arrival, no sale";
§ 2-325 with letters of credit (as of course does article 5) ; §§ 2-326 and 2-327 define
"Sale on Approval" and "Sale or Return" and "Consignment Sales"; § 2-328 deals
with auctions, as to which see also § 2-312(2) and comment 5 (warranty of title).
"
8 JAPANESE CIVIL CODE art 484; JAPANESE COMaaERCIAL CODE art. 516. The inter-
relationship of the Japanese Civil and Commercial Codes should be noted. As to
[ VOiL. 42: 415
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unspecified, then delivery should be at the seller's residence in a non-
commercial transaction, 7 at the seller's place of business in a commer-
cial transaction.' The time for delivery is a "reasonable time," or a
reasonable hour within the day. 9 Payment is to be made at the seller's
house or place of business2 unless payment and delivery are to be
concurrent, in which case payment is to be made at the place of
delivery.2' The time for payment is the time of delivery; in other
words cash, not credit, is presumed.22 The Japanese codes do not deal
specifically with questions of shipment. Consequently it is necessary
to derive rules governing shipment from custom and usage as well as
from case law. Since matters such as the meanings of "C.I.F." and
"F.O.B." in the UCC23 are simply codifications of well-recognized
international custom, results under Japanese law ought to be the
same.
24
III. QUALITY OF GOODS
A. In the United States-Warranty
Far more difficult in both systems than problems of delivery and
payment are those involving the quality of goods which must be
shipped. What does one mean by saying that goods are "defective"?
Under American law this question is characterized as one of "breach
of warranty." Was there a "warranty" in the transaction? What was
it? Was it breached?
The law of warranty is one which historically is quite complex, and
these complexities have not all been eliminated by the UCC. This
unfortunate state of affairs is really just the result of historical acci-
dent-the application of a highly developed and extremely complicated
body of real property terminology to a field where it was not appropri-
ate. It could be applied, if at all, only with great inconvenience. Con-
siderable confusion resulted. Consequently, while it is necessary to
commercial matters, the Commercial Code applies; where there are no Commercial
Code provisions, commercial custom governs; and where there are no Commercial
Code provisions nor customs, the Civil Code applies. CoMMERCIAL CODE art. 1.
A "commercial matter" includes certain defined transactions and also transactions
engaged in by traders (or, merchants).
" JAPANESE CIVIL CODE art. 484.
"JAPANESE COMMERCArL CODE art. 516.
JAPANESE COMMERCIAL CODE art. 520.
:' JAPANESE CIVIL CODE art. 484; JAPANESE COMMERCIAL CODE art. 516.
" JAPANESE CIVIL CODE art. 574.
' JAPANESE CIVIL CODE art. 573.
'See UCC sections cited in note 15 supra.
" See 3 KoMAcHi-a, SH6H5 x6G (Lectures on commercial law) 164-71.
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use warranty terminology since the UCC uses it, it is even more
necessary not to lose sight of the substance of the rules.2 5 This is
simply that the buyer is entitled to receive, and the seller is required
to furnish, whatever goods the contract required to be furnished. The
seller has, in other words, some sort of quality obligation. 6 In practice
this obligation can be merely to furnish goods which fit the normal
meaning of the words used in the contract. This is perhaps the usual
case. However, the extent of the seller's obligation may be broadened;
he may be made almost an insurer of the quality of the goods. Or, on
the other hand, his obligation may be diminished-the buyer may have
no right to demand decent goods from the seller. The extent of the
obligation is determined by the normal methods of contract interpreta-
tion adapted to sales of goods.
As indicated, the usual obligation of quality which is presumed is
that the goods fit the general description. This is accomplished in the
UCC by section 2-314, which provides that in any sale by a "mer-
chant"2 it is presumed that goods will be "merchantable" unless the
contract indicates the contrary. This "implied warranty of merchant-
ability" is defined in section 2-314 as follows:
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract descrip-
tion; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within
the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used;
and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units
involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement
may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
See Jones, supra note 2, at 150-60.
'There is also an obligation to furnish good title to the goods. This is dealt with
in UCC § 2-312. Essentially the obligation is that the title be good and the goods
free from encumbrances known to the seller. This is not particularly new and has
caused little difficulty for years. There is also a provision in this section warranting
that the goods are free of any claim "by way of infringement or the like." This is
clearly important but is not dealt with in this paper.
" "Merchant" is defined by UCC § 2-104 as one "who deals in goods of the kind or
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar
to the practices or goods involved in the transaction." Thus, even a farmer could be
a merchant. One is a "merchant" as to a particular transaction; there is no general
class of merchants under the UCC.
[ VOL. 42 :415
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(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warran-
ties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
Clearly, then, the basic standard is that of the trade-which is of
course what one would expect. If there is a contract between two
dealers of wheat, and the seller wires the buyer: "Offer 10 cars No. 2
hard winter wheat, delivery 2 weeks," then the only reasonable way of
interpreting the contract is to say that "No. 2 hard winter wheat"
means whatever persons in the trade would understand by it." That
is not to say that this is always an easy question to answer.
But the obligation of the seller may go beyond the implied warranty
of merchantability, provided there are special words or circumstances
indicating that this is intended to be the case. If, for instance, the
seller says that the rope he sells will hold 10,000 pounds safely, he has
made an "express warranty" that the rope will not break under a
smaller weight, provided his promise becomes the basis of the bar-
gain.29 If the rope should break under a load of, say, 6000 pounds, the
seller would be liable for damages. 30 This result would follow even
though the phrase "rope" or even "1 1/2 manilla" would ordinarily
mean rope that would support only 5000 pounds. Or, if the buyer asks
for a rope which the seller has reason to know is to be used as a tow
rope on a fishing vessel operating under extreme conditions, and the
seller sells rope to the buyer who is relying on the seller's skill in
choosing the rope, then the seller is impliedly warranting that the
rope is fit for this purpose (the "implied warranty of fitness for par-
ticular purpose"31).
It is apparent as one looks at these sections of the UCC that the
same phrase can serve to determine the extent of the implied warranty
of merchantability, to create an express warranty, and to give rise to
an implied warranty of fitness for particular purposeY Consider, for
See UCC § 2-314(2) (a).
UCC § 2-313. Note that no special words of warranty or guarantee are required
to create an express warranty, nor need the seller have a specific intention of creating
an express warranty. Of course, statements by the seller which are mere opinion or
"puffing" and which do not become part of the basis of the bargain do not create
express warranties. Note also that sales by sample are included under this express
warranty section of the UCC.
I The damages recoverable by the buyer include incidental and consequential
damages. UCC § 2-715.
n UCC § 2-315.
SFor most purposes there is no practical difference in types of warranties.
There are certain areas, however, where it can matter which warranty is applied.
For instance, there can be no implied warranty of merchantability unless the seller
is a merchant. UCC § 2-314(1). On the other hand, there is no such restriction in
creating an express warranty under § 2-313. Likewise the implied warranty of fitness
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example, an invoice which reads: "G.E. 10,000 B.T.U. room air
conditioner 120 V." Under the implied warranty of merchantability,
the seller warrants that the item furnished will pass in the trade under
the description given, and that the item furnished is fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such air conditioners are designed. Where made
the basis of the bargain, the terms of the description are express
warranties that the item is an air conditioner, that it was manufactured
by General Electric, that it has a capacity of 10,000 B.T.U., and that
it can be used on ordinary household current (120 volts). Had the
item supplied in the invoice been in response to an order for a device
which would keep a given-size room at a certain temperature, then the
implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose might also arise.
It should be added that there may be an additional "warranty," labeled
as such, stating the manufacturer will replace parts, etc., for five years,
but this frequently has as its intention the elimination or reduction of
obligations which would otherwise be present.
On the other hand, if a seller is selling, say, the contents of a flooded
warehouse at a very cheap price, he probably does not intend to make
himself liable for anything except the quantity of goods that are there
(and conceivably not even that). This may be clear from the circum-
stances, or the seller may have used such words as "as is." In any
event, he can "disclaim" any warranty of quality.33
It should be noted that if one is drafting a sales contract, there is no
need to worry about all these phrases. One can make the rights and
obligations of both parties perfectly clear without mentioning the word
"warranty"; it might be better to do so. It would be unwise (and
unusual) to draft a contract in terms of "express" and "implied"
warranties, labeled as such. These terms are designed to apply only
when the parties have not otherwise expressed themselves. Therefore,
they are essentially the framework within which the plaintiff and
defendant to a lawsuit make their arguments. Each side will simply
manipulate the words actually used into whatever legal form is most
expedient. In any event, the real argument will be: What was the
contract for? What would reasonable parties have intended if they
had made this contract?
for particular purpose may arise without the seller being a merchant. UCC § 2-315,
comment 4. More important probably is the problem of disclaimers. For instance,
an express warranty will frequently not be affected by a disclaimer clause. UCC
§2-316(1). See generally Akamatsu & Bonneville, Disclaimers of Warranty, Lim-
itation of Liability, and Liquidation of Damages, 42 WAsH. L. Rav. 509 (1967).
' See UCC § 2-316 (3).
[ VOL. 42: 415
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In most situations the precise type of warranty does not matter
very much. But there is one situation where the warranty categories
do matter, and this is in connection with disclaimer. If one wishes to
avoid any quality obligation at all, it is probably well-if not essential
-to say expressly "no warranty of merchantability. '34 And it is
desirable from the standpoint of the buyer to have the seller say he
"expressly warrants," or at any rate to have as much description of
the goods and his proposed use of them as possible, in order to broaden
the seller's undertaking as much as possible.
B. In Japan
1. Nonperformance and Kashk tampo. Japanese law reaches, in
most cases, a result similar to that reached in the United States. It
does so, however, on the basis of rather different theories. Essentially
there are two. The first is the doctrine of Default of Obligation
(saimu furikd) and is, simply, an action for nonperformance.3 5 The
doctrine is applicable when the goods do not meet the specifications
agreed upon in the contract; in such a situation the seller has failed
to "effect performance in accordance with the tenor and purport of the
obligation." This theory would seem to be comparable to breach of an
express warranty under UCC section 2-313, but under Japanese law
a further ingredient is added: the seller must have been responsible
for failing to properly perform. 6 While the burden is on the seller to
prove his lack of fault,3 7 the requirement is still a serious limitation
(from the buyer's point of view) on the application of the default of
obligation theory.
The second theory, and that which more closely resembles the Amer-
ican concept of implied warranty (at least in results), is that of Latent
" UCC § 2-316(2).
JAPANESE CIviL ConE Art. 415:
If an obligor fails to effect performance in accordance with the tenor and purport
of the obligation, the obligee may demand compensation for damages; the same shall
apply in cases where performance becomes impossible for any cause for which the
obligor is responsible.
Art. 541:
If one of the parties does not perform his obligation, the other party may fix a
reasonable period and demand its performance, and may rescind the contract, if no
performance is effected within such period.
"See IsH roTo, KAsHrrsu No Y6KN (Elements of negligence), in 9 MImP6,
S6G5 HANM I KENKYO S6SHO (Comprehensive case study series, civil law) 3-4
(1958). The author indicates that the case law and scholarly opinion was formerly
that the obligor was liable to the obligee for damages arising from nonperformance,
notwithstanding the absence of the obligor's negligence or intentional fault. The
author notes, however, that in recent times the Japanese courts have allowed the
obligor to assert his lack of negligence or intentional fault as a defense.
17 Nakamura v. Koshii, 4 Minshi! 97 (Gr. Ct Cass., Feb. 27, 1925).
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Defects (kasi tampo). The theory is based upon Civil Code article
570: "If any latent defects exist in the object of a sale, the provisions
of Article 566 shall apply. .. ." The provisions of article 566 alluded to
are as follows:
(1) Where the object of a sale is subject to a superficies, emphyteusis,
servitude, right of retention or pledge and the buyer was unaware thereof,
he may rescind the contract only if the object of the contract cannot be
attained thereby; in other cases the buyer may demand only compensa-
tion in damages....
(3) ... the rescission of the contract or the demand of compensation for
damages shall be made within one year from the time when the buyer
became aware of the fact.
Under this theory the buyer who accepts goods, not knowing that
the goods are defective (and being without fault in not so knowing),
may rescind and/or claim damages on discovering the defect. As the
following cases will illustrate, the concept as applied by Japanese
courts is broad enough to give relief where American courts would
rely upon a theory of breach of warranty.
What is a "latent defect"? One judicial expression of the rule is
essentially that when the goods sold have imperfections, and for that
reason their value diminishes or they are not fit for their ordinary use
or the use specified in the contract, the goods are defective; whether
a defect is latent is judged at the time the risk of loss passes to the
buyer.3" The defects are "latent" if the ordinary buyer could not know
of them at the time of entering into the contract.39
The application of these two theories in practice is illustrated by a
number of concrete examples of goods judged to be defective. Thus,
it was held that an ice manufacturing machine guaranteed to be capa-
ble of making four tons of ice per day was defective when it could
make only two tons per day.40 Also defective were: a public bond,
guaranteed to be good, on which payment was subsequently sus-
pended;4 1 a horse said to be fit for the plow, when in fact it was not
Ikemoto v. Ozeki, 12 Minshi! 71, 75 (Gr. Ct. Cass., Jan. 14, 1933). The case is
more fully discussed in note 46 infra.
' INd. It should be noted that in this case the time of entering into the contract
was the time the risk of loss passed to the buyer. Since the risk of loss does not
always pass to the buyer at this point, one should not generalize that the time ofjudging a defect to be "latent" is the time of entering into the contract. For discus-
sion of when risk of loss passes under Japanese law, see Tanikawa, Risk of Loss in
Japanese Sales Transactions, 42 WASH. L. REv. 463 (1967).
"Judgment of Oct. 30, 1913, 2 Hy6ron-sh6hM 366 (Tokyo High Ct.).
"IH6RITSU SHIMBUN (No. 1467) 15 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Feb. 28, 1918). Of course
such a case would not be governed by the UCC article 2 (Article on Sales), which
[ VOL.. 42 : 415
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so fit (being afflicted with chronic osteomalacia) ;42 sugar impounded
by a court because it was contraband; 43 a turbine pump operated by
a gasoline engine with defects in its ignition; 44 and fir planks which
did not conform to the seller's sample, on which the buyer relied.45 It
has also been decided that if the goods are said to have some particular
quality and the goods lack that quality, the goods are defective even
though they are of standard quality.46
In addition to this similarity in the standard of quality required,
other requirements of Japanese law are also similar to the American.
For example, the type of inspection that must be made follows the
UCC test of commercial reasonableness. Moreover, when the buyer
does not know of a defect in the goods which could easily have been
found by him if he had inspected the goods at the time of contract,
does not deal with bonds. UCC §§ 2-102, 2-105. There is no implied warranty that
the obligation will be paid. UCC § 8-306. To be sure, it is possible to make such a
warranty or promise; it then becomes a question of general contract law.
42 Isobe v. Meiji Sangy6, 3 H6gaku 1476 (Gr. Ct. Cass., July 31, 1934).
'Yamaguchi v. Kuroda, 1 Kakyfi minshii 162 (Fukuoka Dist. Ct, Feb. 8, 1950).
" Kamifuji Pumpu Seiz5 K.K. v. Akazawa, 4 Minshfi 217 (Gr. Ct. Cass., March
13, 1925).J Sat5 v. Tagami, 7 Minshai 1071 (Gr. Ct. Cass., Dec. 12, 1928).0 Ikemoto v. Ozeki, 12 Minshfi 71 (Gr. Ct Cass., Jan. 14, 1933). In this case,
plaintiff entered into a contract with defendant by which plaintiff became the sole
distributor of defendant's model "Y-3-3" huller. Plaintiff had relied on defendant's
advertisement that the huller had the capacity of hulling 500 hyo of rice. In fact,
however, the huller did not have such a capacity, and as a result plaintiff was unable
to procure buyers. Plaintiff sought to rescind the distributorship contract and to
recovery money paid to defendant in purchase of hullers for resale. The trial court
denied plaintiff's prayer for relief, holding that the capacity of the hullers was not a
term of the distributorship contract, and because the hullers delivered by defendant
were in fact model "Y-3-3" hullers, there was no nonperformance on the part of
defendant. However, the appellate court reversed, holding for plaintiff on a kashi
tampo theory. The court stated in part that there is a defect in the goods where
something inherent in the goods causes a decrease in value, unfitness for normal use,
or unfitness for a particular use specified in the contract. Whether or not there is
a defect in the above sense is to be judged at the time the risk of loss passes to the
buyer. If the defect is latent (i.e., the ordinary person could not discover it at the
time the contract was entered into), and if the buyer did not know of the defect's
existence, then the seller is bound by kashi tampo liability regardless of whether he
knew of the defect or not. The court noted that there is a defect when the seller has
specifically warranted that the subject of the sales contract has such-and-such capacity
and the delivered goods have not conformed to the warranty. This is because there
is something missing in the goods when viewed from that specific sales transaction,
however perfect the tender may have been when viewed from the general standard.
It might be noted that had the case arisen in the United States, a similar result
might have ensued, but the theory would probably have been breach of express war-
ranty or, perhaps, breach of warranty of fitness for particular purpose.
"JAPAN-ESE CoMaxMCAsL CODE art. 526:
In the case of a sale between traders, the buyer shall, upon taking delivery of the
subject-matter, examine it without delay, and if he discovers any defects therein
or any deficiency in quantity he shall immediately dispatch notice thereof to the
seller; otherwise he has no right to rescind the contract, to demand a reduction in
the price or to claim damages. The same shall apply where within six months
the buyer discovers in the subject-matter of the sale a defect which was not
immediately discoverable. [Translation from 2 EHS No. 2200 (1963).]
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but he does not inspect the goods, the defect is still "latent" and he
can recover, provided his failure to inspect was not his fault. (Nor-
mally of course it would be.) Thus in one case4 at the time of contract
the goods were kept in a custom house where the buyer could not go
in to inspect them. Consequently he did not inspect them and did not
know of the defect. In such circumstances, he was not at fault. Buyers
have likewise been held to have been without fault in the following
cases: sale of refined sak6, when the buyer sampled it but did not know
the sak6 did not contain formalin;49 sale of milk nougats wrapped in
paper bags in a box-the buyer did not know that the nougats were
softened and inferior to the sample in weight and ingredients at the
time of sale.50
In summary, the quality of the goods furnished by the seller must
meet the specifications of the contract; otherwise the seller may be
liable for breach of contract (nonperformance) under Civil Code
article 415. If the contract does not specify the quality of the goods
to be furnished, the goods must be of such quality as will fit their
ordinary use, or the use specified in the contract; otherwise the seller
may be liable under the latent defect theory of Civil Code article 570.
Whether a defect is latent is determined at the time the risk of loss
passes to the buyer; a defect is latent if at that time an ordinary buyer
would not have known of the defect, and if he is not at fault in not
knowing. If the buyer is a merchant, he has a duty to inspect under
Commercial Code article 526, so he would normally be at fault in not
knowing of the defect; but, as the cases illustrate, there are circum-
stances where even a merchant-buyer is excused from fault in failing
to inspect.
It would seem that the differences between American and Japanese
law of the seller's quality obligation are primarily theoretical. To be
sure, there are some differences of substance, notably in regard to
products liability and disclaimer clauses which are considered else-
where in this symposium.51 Nevertheless, in the typical case generally
the same result will obtain under both systems.
G -6meigaisha Sakaikanz5-Shbten v. K.K. Okumura Denki Shbkai, 3 Minshfi
399 (Gr. Ct. Cass., June 23, 1925).
" Osawa v. Takenhashi, H6RITSU SHIMBUN (No. 4469) 11 (Tokyo Dist. Ct.,
June 30, 1939).
'Katsuhara K6gy5 K.K. v. Saitama-ken Gakk5 Kyfishoku Shbhi Kumiai, 4
Kakyfi minshii 1111 (Urawa Dist. Ct., Aug. 8, 1953).
' See Niibori & Cosway, Products Liability in Sales Transactions, 42 NVASH.
L. REv. 483 (1967) ; Akamatsu & Bonneville, supra note 32. See also the discussion of
kashi tampo liability in the latter article, id. at 513-23.
[ VoL. 42 : 415
PERFORMANCE OF SALES CONTRACTS
2. Mistake. Another theory which may possibly be used in Japanese
law in the cases of quality defect is that of mistake. If the parties were
mistaken as to the quality of the goods-where they thought for
instance that a motor had greater horsepower than it actually had-so
that the object of the contract was frustrated, the sale may be held
void under article 95.11 The basis of this is that if, as is usually the
case, the goods are sold as non-defective, when in fact they are defec-
tive, there is an inconsistency between the facts as they really are,
and the facts which the buyer believed to exist at the time of the
contract. This is regarded as being a "mistake" by the buyer. If this
inconsistency is significant, then the requirements of Civil Code article
95 (the general mistake provision) are met. In addition, as indicated
previously, the requirements of kaski tampo (latent defect) are also
met. Consequently, the buyer has the option of bringing an action
based on mistake or of bringing one based on latent defect."5
Such a result is of course possible in the United States but highly
unlikely. It seems probable that something like a situation involving
a mistaken third-party opinion would be required; for example, a
contract for the sale of a painting made in the mistaken belief that it
was supposedly certified by Berenson (say) to be a Caravaggio, when
in fact this certification had been of a completely different painting in
the same gallery. In view of the highly developed American law of
" JAPANESE Cvi. CODE art. 95: "A declaration of intention shall be null and void,
if made under a mistake in regard to any essential elements of the juristic act;
however, if there has been gross negligence on the part of the declarant, its nullity
cannot be asserted by the declarant himself.'
'Illustrative is Nakano Tekk6 Gshigaisha v. Horie, 27 Minroku 2160 (Gr.
Ct. Cass., Dec. 15, 1921). In that case B purchased a 130-horsepower electric motor
from S. Sometime after the sale, it was discovered that the motor generated only
thirty to seventy horsepower. B sought repayment of the purchase price, contending
that the sales contract was null and void under the general mistake provision,
article 95 (consequently the ten-year prescription period under article 167 applied).
The trial court determined, however, that because there was a latent defect, articles
570 and 566 applied (with a consequent one-year limitation), rather than article 95.
On appeal, B's argument was sustained and the Court ruled that article 95 may co-
exist with articles 570 and 566. The Court explained that article 95 applies when
during the contract negotiations the buyer declares that a particular quality is to be
an essential element of the contract. When because of a hidden defect the goods are
not of that particular quality, there has been a misunderstanding because the goods
were not in fact as the parties believed them to be; hence, the mistake provision
applies to render the contract null and void. The mistake provision operates, how-
ever, only when the misunderstanding concerns an essential element of the contract.
Therefore, if the buyer had made no declaration of intention that a particular quality
was to be an essential element of the contract, article 95 would have no application.
The buyer's remedy would then have to be under the latent defect provisions of
articles 570 and 566. The Court remanded the case to determine whether the buyer
had expressly intended that "130-horsepower" should be an essential element of the
contract.
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warranty, developments along this line appear to be unlikely. 4
In sum, then, under both the UCC and the Japanese codes, the
parties have almost total freedom to set whatever standards of pre-
formance they wish. When they have entered into a valid contract,
but have left certain matters unprovided for, the codes will supply
certain standard provisions which are quite similar in the two coun-
tries. But these provisions are always subject to being superseded by
indication of contrary intent.
IV. PERFOPmJANCB AFTER BREACH
Despite the existence of these rules, actual consideration of the
problems under a sales contract by a lawyer will, as indicated above,
usually begin after there is a breach or the threat of one. The UCC
envisages three stages at which this consideration is likely to take
place and sets up somewhat different procedures for each. The three
stages are: 1) when there is reasonable doubt that the other party
will perform, though as yet there is no failure to perform nor repudi-
ation; 2) anticipatory repudiation by one party before his performance
is due; and 3) breach. These seem to reflect the actual situations
fairly well and hence serve as a satisfactory framework for discussion
of both systems.
A. Reasonable Grounds for Insecurity Prior to Breach or Repudiation
It often happens in the course of performance that one party fears
the other will not perform when the time arrives for him to do so.
This might result from any number of reasons. For example, the
market price may have risen appreciably so that the contract is very
disadvantageous to the seller, and perhaps he has already broken
other similar contracts with this or other buyers. Or, either the seller
or the buyer may be in poor financial condition though not formally
insolvent. There are, of course, many other possibilities. In any event,
if there is some reasonable ground for insecurity, then the party who
regards himself as insecure can, under the UCC, demand assurances
that the other party will perform, and if he does not receive such
assurances within a reasonable time (not to exceed thirty days), then
'The UCC does not deal with the problem of mistake except for the single in-
stance where, in a contract for an identified object, the goods were destroyed at the
time the contract was made, or subsequently, but before the risk of loss passed to the
buyer; in such case the contract is avoided. UCC § 2-613. Consequently, the usual
mistake situation is governed by the common law (or in this case equity) of the
state concerned. UCC § 1-103.
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he can cancel the contract and proceed to his various remedies for
breach.
Unlike the UCC, the Japanese codes do not have a provision which
is generally applicable to such threatened misperformances by the
other party, except in the event of bankruptcy." However, some
Japanese writers believe that if, after the execution of the contract,
the financial situation of either party deteriorates to such an extent
that there is reasonable doubt that he can perform, the other party,
even though he must perform first according to the agreement, may
delay performance until he receives reasonable security or assurances
(fuan-no-k~ben).57
B. Anticipatory Repudiation
Often, prior to the date of performance, one party will notify the
other, formally or otherwise, that he does not intend to go ahead with
the contract, or he will fail to respond to inquiries, or will imply that
he is not going to perform on time. In such a case what can the other
party do? He can, of course, follow the procedure indicated above for
one who feels insecure. It is often difficult in fact to establish just
when there is a true repudiation, so the above procedure enables one
to clarify the situation. At any rate, once the repudiation is established
then the UCC sets forth the remedies of the injured party as follows.58
When either party repudiates the contract with respect to a perform-
ance not yet due the loss of which will substantially impair the value of
the contract to the other, the aggrieved party may
(a) for a commercially reasonable time await performance by the
repudiating party; or
(b) resort to any remedy for breach (Section 2-703 or Section 2-711),
even though he has notified the repudiating party that he would
await the latter's performance and has urged retraction; and
(c) in either case suspend his own performance or proceed in accord-
ance with the provisions of this Article on the seller's right to
identify goods to the contract notwithstanding breach or to sal-
vage unfinished goods (Section 2-704).
It should be noted that this is subject to a requirement of reasonable-
ness. Thus if the contract is made 1 February for delivery to be
- UCC § 2-609.
' See note 103 infra.
15(1) WAGATSU A, SAIKEN KAKT JOI 84 (1962).
UCC § 2-610.
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1 December, and the seller repudiates on 1 March, the buyer cannot
wait until 1 December for him to perform.
Again, there does not appear to be any equivalent provision in
Japanese law except, of course, that each party can withhold his
performance until the other party performs (absent a credit agree-
ment)." In fact, it seems doubtful that when one party to a sales
contract repudiates the contract with respect to a performance not
yet due, the aggrieved party may resort to any remedy for breach
of contract before his own performance is due. Also Civil Code article
541 provides: "If one of the parties does not perform his obligation,
the other party may fix a reasonable period and demand its perform-
ance, and may rescind the contract, if no performance is effected
within such period." The provision is construed to apply only after
the defaulting obligor's performance has become due.60
C. Breach
1. Under the Uniform Commercial Code. One party performs im-
properly, what can the other party do? This cannot really be answered
until one decides what improper performance is. The UCC would
seem to say that any deviation from the contract is a breach." If the
contract says delivery by 5:00 p.m., then delivery at 6:00 p.m. is a
breach. This is theoretically the traditional rule of Anglo-American
contracts, but it is subject to many exceptions in the UCC. In general
these exceptions may be summed up in the proposition that precise
compliance cannot be insisted on if the circumstances indicate that a
more flexible approach was to be expected. However, it is really only
feasible to consider the UCC approach to breach from two points of
view: that of the injured buyer and that of the injured seller, since
JAPAxESE CIvm CODE art. 533: "One of the parties to a bilateral contract may
refuse performance of his own obligation until the other party tenders performance of
his obligation; however, this shall not apply where the obligation of the party is notdue."
H owever, article 543 of the Civil Code provides: "If performance has become
impossible in whole or in part by any cause for which the obligor is responsible,
the obligee may rescind the contract." It could be argued perhaps that by analogy to
article 543, the aggrieved party ought not have to await the obligor's default in
performance where the obligor has repudiated the contract. The argument might
have appeal out of regard for the disadvantageous position of the aggrieved party
while waiting for the repudiating party's time for performance to become due.
"UCC § 2-601 provides that if the goods or the tender of delivery "fail in any
respect to conform to the contract," the buyer may reject the whole. This puts him in
a position to use all his remedies for breach under § 2-711 (1). It is difficult to find
a precisely equivalent provision for the seller since the buyer's performance is
essentially simple-pay. But UCC §2-703 seems to have the same approach as
UCC § 2-601 and gives the seller his various remedies whenever the buyer does not
perform precisely as required.
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the performance of each is so different, and since that is the way the
UCC is organized. Ordinarily the buyer has nothing to do except to
pay. The seller, on the other hand, usually has a number of perform-
ances. Hence the ways in which he can breach are more numerous.
a. The injured buyer. The basic aim of the provisions of the UCC
which deal with the buyer's remedies is to give him all the help he
needs to be put in the position he would have been in if the contract
had been performed. Further, the UCC recognizes that a breach of a
contract is not necessarily a sin. Contracts are frequently not per-
formed precisely as written and the parties make appropriate adjust-
ments. Often the "breaching" seller would be quite justifiably sur-
prised to learn he could be required to do anything more than make
a price adjustment-if that. Consequently, the UCC provides as its
basic remedy for the injured buyer the right simply to refuse to per-
form, or "cancel," to use the UCC's language. Though it is not spe-
cifically provided that he must do so, he would obviously be well
advised to notify the seller of this intention. The buyer retains a right
to get damages. If the defect is one in the goods, then his course of
action varies according to the circumstances. He has clearly a right
to reject the goods.6" If he has a right to inspect the goods (as he
normally does) and the defect is one which a reasonable inspection
would reveal (or, of course, if for any reason he in fact knows of the
defect), then he must reject the goods and notify the selelr that he has
done so, and why, or be barred from a remedy." The buyer is liable
' UCC § 2-601. The remedies of the buyer are set out in UCC § 2-711:
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer right-
fully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to any goods
involved, and with respect to the whole if the breach goes to the whole contract
(Section 2-612), the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done so may
in addition to recovering so much of the price as has been paid
(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as to all the goods
affected whether or not they have been identified to the contract; or
(b) recover damages for non-delivery as provided in this Article (Section
2-713).(2) Where the seller fails to deliver or repudiates the buyer may also(a) if the goods have been identified recover them as provided in this
Article (Section 2-502) ; or(b) in the proper case obtain specific performance or replevy the goods as
provided in this Article (Section 2-716).
(3) On rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance a buyer has
a security interest in goods in his possession or control for any payments made
on their price and any expenses reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt,
transportation, care and custody and may hold such goods and resell them in
like manner as an aggrieved seller (Section 2-706).
' Under UCC § 2-607, acceptance of the goods with knowledge of the defect pre-
cludes any remedy if the seller is not notified promptly of breach. Rejection is in-
effective unless the buyer notifies the seller. UCC § 2-602. Moreover, the grounds of
rejection must be given. UCC § 2-605.
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to pay for the goods once he has "accepted" them, 4 but if he accepts
goods without knowing of a breach which he is not bound to know,
then he may revoke his acceptance upon discovery, providing this
takes place within a reasonable time. He can also revoke if he accepted
on the assumption that the defect would be cured." Once he has
rejected, he must, if he is a merchant, hold the goods at the disposition
of the seller and follow any reasonable instructions."0 If he is a mer-
chant, and the goods are in danger of suffering great loss as a result of
physical injury or market fluctuations (if they are "perishable"), he
is under a duty to dispose of them to best advantage even before
receiving instructions. 67
b. The injured seller. As indicated, the seller's position in general
is simpler than the buyer's. He merely wishes to get his money. If
the buyer refuses to pay where payment is due, the seller can then
cancel the contract and bring his various actions for breach of contract.
Normally he will get damages.0 '
2. Japanese Law. The provisions of Japanese law are similar but
not identical. The most obvious difference is one of organization. The
UCC, as indicated, simply mentions various typical fact situations and
indicates what the rights and duties of the parties are. The Japanese
codes are more abstract. They analyze the parties' obligations in terms
of conditions, and then set up relationships among the conditions.
Obviously in such an analysis, there is no difference--in theory at
least-between the buyer and the seller. Thus in the absence of a
credit agreement, delivery and payment are Concurrent Conditions
(d~ji rik5 no kankei). 9 The obligation to deliver the goods is im-
pliedly conditioned on receiving in exchange the agreed payment. The
obligation to pay the price is impliedly conditioned on receiving in ex-
UCC § 2-607(1). "Acceptance" is defined in UCC § 2-606 as follows:
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to the seller
that the goods are conforming or that he will take or retain them in
spite of their non-conformity; or
(b) fails to make an effective rejection (subsection (1) of Section 2-602),
but such acceptance does not occur until the buyer had had a reasonable
opportunity to inspect them; or
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership; but if such act
is wrongful as against the seller it is an acceptance only if ratified by
him.(2) Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is acceptance of that entire
unit.
- UCC §2-607(2).
UCC § 2-603.
Ibid.
UCC § 2-703.
JAPANESE CIVIL CODE art. 533, quoted supra note 59.
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change the agreed delivery. The seller can refuse to deliver the goods
to the buyer until the buyer tenders the payment, and the buyer can
refuse to pay the price until the seller tenders delivery. This is an
application to sales contracts of the Right To Demand Simultaneous
Performance (diji rik6 no kibenken) of bilateral contracts. As a re-
sult of the principle, one party to a sales contract is not liable for
default even though he does not perform his obligation at the agreed
time, provided the other party has not tendered his performance."0 If
one party is sued for his failure to perform his obligation, the demand
that he must pay the price in exchange for the possession of the goods,
or deliver the goods in exchange for the price,7 1 will be denied where the
plaintiff has failed to perform. 2
A credit agreement from its nature waives the right to simultaneous
performance. So, during the agreed credit term, the party giving
credit cannot refuse to perform first.73 When the agreed credit term
expires, there is some dispute as to whether the right to demand
simultaneous performance revives or not. Many text-writers and
opinions affirm automatic revival when the agreed credit term ex-
pires.74 According to this point of view, once the credit term expires
the seller who gave credit to the buyer need not deliver the goods
without receiving the promised payment in return. However, where it
is obvious from the contract that one party need not perform his
obligation until the other party performs-e.g., where the buyer is
" Suzuki v. Ebizuka, 23 Minroku 1941 (Gr. Ct. Cass., Oct. 27, 1917) ; Ebizuka v.
Suzuki, 19 Minroku 993 (Gr. Ct. Cass., Dec. 4, 1913); imata v. Saito, H6RITSu
SHIMBUN (No. 2276) 18 (Tokyo High Ct., May 21, 1924); Kishihara v. Nomura,
H6RITSU SHIMBUN (No. 2245) 1 (Tokyo High Ct., Feb. 25, 1924) ; Hayashi v. Tashiro,
HGRITSU SHIMBUN (No. 2245) 15 (Tokyo High Ct., Feb. 25, 1924); Kaneko v.
Furuya, HfRTsu SHIMUN (No. 1415) 18 (Tokyo High Ct., May 6, 1918); Shigaki
v. Kuroda, HSRITSU SHIMBUN (No. 1445) 20 (Kobe Dist. Ct, Feb. 6, 1918); 1
WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 57, at 98; YUaoKr, SAIKEN KAKURON (Detailed
explanation of obligations) 90-92 (1956).
'Miz5 v. Yoshihiro, H6RITSU SHIMBUN (No. 2802) 14 (Gr. Ct. Cass., Dec.
13, 1927); Nagao v. Matsumoto, 24 Minroku 687 (Gr. Ct Cass., April 15, 1918);
Yukii v. Osawa, 17 Minroku 772 (Gr. Ct. Cass., Dec. 11, 1911); Oppenel Frail
Sh~kai v. Kato, 14 Minroku 733 (Gr. Ct. Cass., June 17, 1908); 1 WAGATSUMA,
op. cit. mipra note 57, at 97; YUNOKI, op. cit. supra note 70, at 84, 85.
"However, the party entitled to simultaneous performance must assert it in court;
otherwise it will not be considered by the court. Tomari v. Ayabe, H6ITSU
SHIM3UN (No. 3816) 7 (Gr. Ct. Cass., Feb. 19, 1935); 1 WAGATSUMA, op. cit. .supra
note 57, at 96.
P.H. Makee v. Hiraide, HORITSU SHIMBUN (No. 1417) 18 (Osaka High Ct.,
April 25, 1918) ; 1 WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 57, at 91; YUNOKI, op. cit. suepra
note 70, at 69.
"Yamada v. Utsunomiya, 11 Kakyfi minshil 311 (Takamatsu High Ct., Feb. 12,
1960); Akagi v. Kawai, 7 Kakyfi minshfi 253 (Tokyo Dist Ct, Feb. 11, 1957);
SUEKAWA, KEIYAKUHO (Law of contract) 68 (1958). Contra, YuNoKI, op. cit. supra
note 70, at 73.
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required to pay the price only after he receives the goods and inspects
them-the one who has to perform first cannot demand simultaneous
performance, even though the other's time for performance has also
arrived.75 Where the credit does not expire by lapse of time, but
rather is extinguished by the buyer's intervening insolvency, it is not
clear whether there is a revival of the first performing party's right
to demand simultaneous performance. Many authors say there is
revival,7 but some influential authors reject this conclusion.77  There
is no reported decision on this point.
One party's past tender of performance does not deprive the other
of his right to demand simultaneous performance, 78 but one party's
performance itself does deprive the other of it. 9 In this respect, Yukii
v. Osawa8° is instructive. In that case the lower court said that where
a party has once made a legitimate tender of performance, and this
tender placed the other party in delay (chitai), the party in delay, so
long as the delay exists, cannot assert the plea of concurrent conditions
against the other party's request to perform. On appeal, the Court
reversed the lower court's judgment on grounds that the lower court
had an erroneous understanding of the plea of concurrent conditions.
The Court held that only where there is a continuing tender is the
party in delay deprived of his right to demand simultaneous perform-
ance. The Court admitted that Civil Code articles 41381 and 492 82
would seem to place in default the party who did not accept the tender;
but the Court said that these code articles merely affected the obliga-
tion of the tenderer and in no way affect the obligation of the other
party. The Court reasoned that the plea of concurrent conditions
' TANIKAWA, SHI161IN NO BAIBAI (The buying and selling of merchandise) 175
(1964) ; 1 WAGATSUMA, op. Cit. supra note 57, at 92.
" TANIKAVwA, op. cit. supra note 75, at 175; 1 WAGATSUMA, op. Cit. supra note
57, at 84.1KoND6, SAIKENH6 KAKURON (Detailed explanation of the law of obligations)
43 (1938) ; YuNoEI, op. cit. supra note 70, at 75.
1Kobayashi v. Ota, H6RInsu SHIMBUTT (No. 3313) 15 (Gr. Ct. Cass., Sept. 8,
1931) ; Tino v. Bizenshoji, 7 Minshii 383 (Gr. Ct. Cass., May 31, 1928) ; Horikoshi
v. Arai, 23 Minroku 1960 (Gr. Ct. Cass., Nov. 10, 1917); Yukii v. Osaia, 17
Minroku 772 (Gr. Ct. Cass., Dec. 11, 1911); Kodawara v. Mori, 5 Kakyfi minshii
762 (Tokyo High Ct., May 29, 1954); SUEKAWA, op. cit. supra note 74, at 70; 1
WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 57, at 94-96. Contra, YucoKI, op. cit .supra note
70, at 79-81.
YuNoKi, op. cit. supra note 70, at 76-78.
7 Minroku 772 (Gr. Ct. Cass., Dec. 11, 1911).
' JAPANESE CIviL CODE art. 413: "If an obligee refuses to accept performance of
an obligation or is unable to accept it, such obligee shall be responsible for delay as
from the time when the performance has been tendered."
' JAPANESE CIVIL CODE art. 492: "A tender of performance shall relieve the
obligor from all responsibilities for non-performance as from the time of such
tender."
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granted under article 53383 was a defensive mechanism designed to
protect parties to a bilateral contract, a defense which can always be
asserted by a party who is asked to perform his obligation. The Court
reasoned that if this conclusion were not supportable, then a party
who once made tender and subsequently became insolvent would be
able to take advantage of the other party, who would be required to
perform knowing that he would not be able to receive counterperform-
ance from the insolvent party. Such a result would be unjust.
One who has the definite intention not to perform his obligation in
spite of the other's tender cannot insist on simultaneous performance.84
In a continuous supply contract, one party can withhold his next
performance if the other party has not fulfilled his previous perform-
ance.85 So, for example, a power distribution company can stop the
supply of electric power in February if the customer has not paid his
January bill. 6 This is somewhat more favorable to the aggrieved
party than the American rule in installment contracts."
a. The injured buyer. When the seller does not perform his obliga-
tion when performance is due, and such nonperformance is his fault-
including that of his assistants (rikd-hojoska)--or when the seller's
performance becomes impossible through his fault, the buyer can
recover damages caused by the seller's breach of obligation and can
rescind the contract, provided notice is given within a reasonable
period (saikoku), though in the case of impossibility notice is not
necessary. Where there has been a delay in performance, but the
buyer has not yet rescinded, the seller can still perform his obligation
and the buyer cannot refuse the seller's performance. In such a
situation, the seller's tender of performance must be accompanied
with a tender of compensation for damages resulting from the delay.
The Great Court of Cassation was met with this problem in Naijo
v. Nishimaru8 and resolved it with the above rule. The Court rea-
soned that until rescission is actually executed, the contract continues
Quoted supra note 59.
e.Yamashita v. Fujiyama Seizai K.K., H6RiTSU SHIMBUN (No. 4209) 13 (Gr.
Ct. Cass., Oct. 30, 1937); Kawawaki v. Takagi, 16 Mfinshfi 33 (Gr. Ct. Cass., Feb.
9, 1937); Sawada v. Tanabe, 14 Minroku 477 (Gr. Ct. Cass., April 23, 1908); Mori
v. Saito, H6=rrsu SHImBUN (No. 1663) 19 (Nagasaki High Ct., Jan. 24, 1920):
Suwa v. Haruhara, H6Irrsu sHrI MuN (No. 3350) 15 (Tokyo Dist Ct, Nov. 30
1931).
SUEKAWA, op. cit. supra note 74.
This would not constitute a "sale of goods" under UCC § 2-105 and would not,
in consequence, be governed by the UCC.
See UCC 2-612.
25 Minroku 2133 (Gr. Ct. Cass., Nov. 27, 1919).
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in existence so the seller is still entitled to perform his obligation.
However, in the interest of fairness the seller must compensate the
buyer for any damages caused by the seller's delay in performing.
Impossibility may be a defense to the seller's nonperformance, pro-
vided the impossibility does not arise because of the seller's fault."9
While impossibility is discussed in detail elsewhere in this sympo-
sium,"0 it might be noted here that impossibility which is not the fault
of the seller will not excuse the seller when the impossibility arises
after the seller has already delayed his performance. For example, in
Mizuumi v. Watanabe9l S had contracted to sell tobacco leaves to B.
After S's performance had become due, but before he had performed,
the Tobacco Monopoly Act was enacted, rendering S's future per-
formance impossible. To B's claim for damages resulting from S's
nonperformance, S defended on a plea of impossibility. The defense
was to no avail. The Court reasoned that S was responsible for the
"impossibility" since he was at fault in not performing on time; had S
performed on schedule, the subsequent enactment of the Tobacco
Monopoly Act would not have rendered S's obligation impossible to
perform.
b. The injured seller. If the buyer refuses to pay when payment is
due, the seller can rescind the contract and recover damages. As to
damages caused by breach of an obligation to pay money, article 419
of the Civil Code provides:
1. The amount of compensation for damages against non-performance
of a money obligation shall be determined by the legal rate of interest:
however, in case the agreed rate of interest exceeds the legal rate, it
shall be determined by the former.
2. With regard to the compensation for damages mentioned in the
preceding paragraph, the obligee is neither bound to prove the actual
damages nor can the obligor set up vis major as a defence.
In the case of commercial transactions, the legal rate of interest is
six per cent per annum under Commercial Code article 541; in the
case of non-commercial transactions, the legal interest rate is five per
cent under Civil Code article 414.
There is, it may be pointed out, an additional similarity between
An example of seller's fault is where he delivers to a second buyer (without
the possibility of getting the goods back) the very goods which he has contracted
to sell to the first buyer.
'See Igarashi & Rieke, Impossibility and Frustration in Sales Contracts, 42
WASH. L. REv. 445 (1967).
' 12 Minroku 1358 (Gr. Ct. Cass., Oct. 29, 1906).
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the American and Japanese codes. The merchant-buyer who receives
defective goods authorized to store them for the seller's account and
he has a security interest in them. There may be an important differ-
ence. In the case of perishable goods, the buyer in the UCC must sell
the goods, and he need not get anyone's approval. 2 There is no such
provision under the Japanese codes. Perhaps argument could be made
that the Civil Code's bailment provisions apply-e.g., "A gratuitous
bailee shall use the same care in the custody of the thing bailed as he
uses in respect of his own property."93 It is possible that the general
principle forbidding abuse of rights9" could be used to require the
Japanese buyer to sell goods that were in danger.
V. SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS
A. Problems of Proof
To say, as we have, that the rules of law are similar is only to state
the obvious. Given freedom of contract and rules of performance
which are framed with the intention of producing results similar to
what the parties would have provided if they had thought of some
matter, it is unlikely that the law of performance of contracts in two
countries like the United States and Japan-members of the same
international commercial community-would be very different. If the
contracts are the same, the law will be the same. But of course the
difficult problems in this area are not those of law but of fact. If the
parties' manifested intent is to be enforced, then the problem is always
a question of what that intent was-a question of fact. Breach always
involves questions of fact. What was the condition of the goods when
they were injured, if they were? What was the local custom regarding
the use of refrigerated cars; was it unreasonable for seller to make a
contract not using such cars? What sort of inspection was reasonable?
What was discovered? What inspection could have been made? What
would have been discovered if it had been? These are all fact ques-
tions. And usually the facts will not be neatly arranged. There will
be a lot of confusion-perhaps wires and telephone calls back and
forth when goods fail to arrive or prove to be unsatisfactory. The
court is going to have to take this jumble of evidence and arrive at a
judgment in some amount for one party or the other. Presenting the
- UCC §§ 2-603, 2-604.
"s JAPANESE CIVIL CODE art. 659.
" JAPANESE CIVIL CODE art. 1 (3) : "No abusing of rights is permitted."
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material in such a way as to make a favorable result likely can of
course be extremely difficult. On the other hand, the dealings between
the parties are usually so mixed up, and commercial customs so often
vague and ambiguous, that any party can almost always have a
respectable case made for him.
Clearly in this area generalizations are useless. Citations of cases
are not very helpful since almost every case can be distinguished on its
facts. What probably ought to be kept in mind, however, is that while
the problem of proof which the parties will face in Japan and the
United States is about the same, the methods of proof are quite differ-
ent. This is no place to go into an analysis of the difference between
Japanese and American civil procedure, but the basic difference must
be mentioned. Essentially this is that in the United States proof
consists of oral testimony supplemented by documents. In Japan the
reverse is true. Moreover, the approach of judges is quite different.
In the United States, although probably most commercial cases-at
least in large cities-are tried without a jury, still a jury is always
possible. Furthermore, the atmosphere of all trials in the United States
is permeated by the existence of the jury system. Essentially this
makes the requirements of proof more exacting. Evidence must be
quite explicit. There are limitations as to what inferences will be
drawn and what evidence can be considered. Application of the Parol
Evidence Rule and Statute of Frauds is clearly influenced by the
existence of the jury. On the other hand, the free use of oral testimony
means that there will be essentially more flexibility than if only docu-
ments are involved. In Japan, in accordance with the continental
model, there is no jury. Hence the judges normally have much freedom
in what they will consider as evidence and the length to which they will
go in their interpretations. But, on the other hand, the general reliance
on documentary testimony makes for slightly less freedom.
There is nothing more that can usefully be said about these problems
here, but they must be kept in mind.
B. Insolvency and Assignment
Heretofore, we have been dealing only with the rights of the buyer
and seller as between themselves, but of course it can easily happen
that the rights of third parties become involved. This can happen
voluntarily by means of assignment. The UCC is very favorable to
assignment. Indeed, it makes it rather difficult to prevent assignment
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of the rights of one party to compensation when he has nothing further
to perform. The right to damages for breach of contract can be
assigned regardless of provisions to the contrary in the contract.99 The
performance itself can be delegated except where otherwise agreed, or
where the other party has substantial interest in having his original
promisor perform." Japanese law is not significantly different. 7
However, in addition to this voluntary assignment, there are others
of an involuntary nature. One occurs on the death of either party.
The UCC does not specifically provide for this. Hence the common
law applies (note, it is the differing common law of individual states
that applies). Generally, in the United States at the present time,
contract rights and duties devolve on whomever the decedent desig-
nated if he left a will, otherwise to the estate. The successor to the
decedent is both bound to perform and empowered to continue the
contract, unless, of course, the performance is so personal that the
obligation ceases with death." In the case of corporate merger or
consolidation, the resulting corporation will normally take over all the
obligations of the predecessor corporations. 9 Again, the situation in
Japan is substantially the same. Unless the performance is so per-
sonal that the obligation ceases with death-a rare situation in com-
mercial cases-the decedent's estate or heirs succeed to his interests
and the obligee must permit them to perform. The "amalgamated"
company assumes the duties of its predecessors.100
Perhaps most important of all is the situation on insolvency. There
is the same problem as with voluntary assignment, merger, or death,
and in the United States the trustee in bankruptcy is given the option
of affirming or rejecting all executory contracts within sixty days.' 0 '
This is, of course, governed by federal bankruptcy law and not by the
UCC. Insolvency does not, under the UCC, avoid the contract, but
it will probably create reasonable grounds for insecurity and give the
injured parties the right to demand assurances 02 (which of course
the bankrupt could not provide).
UCC § 2-210(2).
" UCC § 2-210.
'As to assignment of performance, see JAPANESE CIVrL CODE art. 474. As to
assignment of debts, see id. art. 466.
SSee 6 CoRmrN, CoNTRAcrs § 1334 (1962).
c See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259 (1953).
"'For succession to the rights and liabilities of the decedent; see JAPANESE
CIVn. CODE art. 896. For succession to the rights and duties of predecessor com-
panies, see JAPANESE CoRmuciAL CODE art. 103.
' United States Bankruptcy Act § 70(b), 52 Stat. 840 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(b)
(1964).
' UCC § 2-609.
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Under Japanese law there is a similar provision in connection with
the Right To Demand Simultaneous Performance (ddij riki no kiben-
ken). If one party goes bankrupt, or a corporate reorganization pro-
cedure is begun before either delivery or payment is completed, the
bankrupt's assignee has the right to elect whether to perform contracts
or to reject them. When he elects performance of the contract, he may
claim the performance from the other in exchange for the performance
of the bankrupt's obligation. 10 3
But there are additional problems to insolvency, quite apart from
assignment, notably the ability, in effect, of the buyer or seller to gain
the position of a preferred creditor in the event of the other's insol-
vency. In other words, if the buyer becomes insolvent after having
received the goods, but before payment, must the seller simply file a
claim with the trustee in bankruptcy or can he get the goods? Con-
trariwise, if it is the seller who is insolvent, can the buyer get the goods
or is he reduced to the position of a general creditor?
The problem of the seller is complicated by the fact that secured
credit sales are quite common, and the problem of priority between
the seller and a creditor of the buyer is governed generally by the law
of chattel security which will not be treated here. 0 4 One can perhaps
say that in general under the UCC if the goods are actually physically
received by the buyer, then the law of secured transactions will govern,
unless the sale was a sale on approval or a sale and return-that is, a
sale in which it was specified that the buyer's physical receipt of
the goods was only, in effect, to give him the right to examine and ac-
cept them if he wished to do so within a certain time.'05 Even this tran-
saction may well be called a secured transaction, however, and gov-
erned accordingly, if there is any suspicion that it is being used fraudu-
lently. In the normal sale the seller can stop delivery to the buyer up to
the moment when the goods are received by him or a negotiable docu-
ment of title has been issued and negotiated to the buyer (or any holder
in due course).'°6 In addition, if the buyer was insolvent when he re-
ceived the goods, the seller may reclaim them if he demands them
within ten days of receipt. If such delivery was the result of misrepre-
luHasanhO (Bankruptcy law) art. 59(1) (Law No. 71, 1922), in 2 EHS No.
2340; Kaisha k~seih (Corporate reorganization law) art. 103(1) (Law No. 172,
1952), in 2 EHS No. 2350.
104 See Sono & Shattuck, Personal Property as Collateral i Japan and the United
States, 39 WASH. L. REv. 570 (1964).
' UCC §§ 2-326, 2-327.
U CC § 2-705.
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sentation of solvency, the ten-day limit does not apply.'0 7
In Japanese law, if the buyer becomes insolvent after having re-
ceived the goods, and before payment, the seller is given the position
of a preferred creditor as to these goods. 08 He is regarded as having a
Statutory Lien (sakidori-totsuken) on such goods. In the event of
bankruptcy, the seller is given a preferred position which will be
honored."' Japanese law also recognizes the seller's right of stoppage
in transit. Thus, if the seller ships goods on credit to the buyer and
the buyer becomes bankrupt while the goods are in the possession of
the carrier, the seller can stop delivery and retake them."0 Of course
the seller has the power to stop delivery in any case where delivery
has not been made nor a negotiable document of title issued."' But
in the absence of insolvency, if this action injures the buyer, the
seller will be liable for damages.
In the event of the seller's insolvency, under Japanese law, the buyer
who has paid all or part of the purchase price may be able to claim the
goods in preference to other creditors. Thus if the buyer has actually
received the goods or a negotiable document of title to them, he may
keep them. Otherwise he is in the position of a general creditor.
Under the UCC the buyer is also given certain rights to the goods
as against creditors of the seller if he has paid all or part of the price,
and the seller becomes insolvent within ten days of having received
the installment. The buyer must, of course, tender the amount still
due in order to obtain the goods. 2 If he has actually received the
goods or received a negotiable document of title to them, then, of
course, he may keep them. Otherwise, he is entitled to get the goods
only if he qualified as a preferred secured creditor under the UCC
provisions governing secured transactions (article 9).
VI. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS UNDER THE CODES
In sum the results that are likely to be reached under the Japanese
and American codes do not appear to be materially different. The
procedures that a party may have developed under one system for
dealing with breach (the sort of notice given to the other party for
' 
7UCC § 2-702.
"'JAPANESE CIVIL CODE arts. 311 (6), 322.
"Hasanh9 (Bankruptcy law) art. 92 (Law No. 71, 1922), in 2 EHS No. 2340.
It might be noted, however, that this preferred position is of little practical utility.
See discussion in Sono & Shattuck, supra note 104, at 618-19, & n.167.
"'°HasanhO (Bankruptcy law) art. 89 (Law No. 71, 1922), in 2 EHS No. 2340.
"
1 JAPANESE COMMERCIAL CODE art. 582.
" UCC § 2-502.
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example), will not have to be changed in all probability in working
under the other. Most of the rules can, in any event, be avoided by
the use of appropriate provisions in the contract. But all of the matters
that have been mentioned here depend in the last analysis on enforce-
ment in a court. Consequently it may be questioned whether any of
this meets the real problems of those involved in commercial trans-
actions. The risks of litigation in any system are considerable, and
the difficulties of litigating a matter in a foreign country are formidable
indeed. It is questionable whether litigation in such circumstances is
ever a realistic alternative, unless the stakes are very large, or the
defendant has assets in the plaintiff's jurisdiction, or, of course, unless
the plaintiff is sufficiently well represented in the defendant's country
(with branch offices and the like) to find lawsuits easy to bring. Many
merchants would certainly find it quite impractical to sue.
Is there any alternative? The best one is that which is most used
by merchants: reliance on the informal pressures of the community.
Most people either fulfil their contracts or work out some sort of
mutally satisfactory adjustment when there is disagreement, because
otherwise they find it difficult to continue doing many types of busi-
ness. The world of business is small enough--even internationally-
that many repetitions of unsatisfactory business dealing become well
known, and make it difficult to continue to operate easily. Hence the
best assurance that the person one is dealing with will in fact fulfil his
obligation, is the general desire to maintain a good reputation. Admit-
tedly, however, there are many occasions when such an approach is
not practicable, when for one reason or another one must deal with
those one does not know (or knows all too well). If one is willing to
go to the trouble and expense of a lawsuit, it is, as indicated, easy
enough to work out a contract which will cover most eventualities,
and make a favorable judgment likely. But it is also possible to avoid
most risks by simply arranging the transaction properly. If one is a
buyer, the important thing is to make sure that one gets satisfactory
goods before paying. This can be accomplished simply by obtaining
a right of inspection prior to payment (although if the transaction is
a documentary one, this right will have to be specifically provided
for.).. 3 The seller wishes not to deliver before he is paid. This is of
course the whole reason for having documentary transactions. And
- UCC § 2-513 (3).
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there are refinements, such as letters of credit, to make the system more
flexible. 114
Indeed, this is perhaps the most important thing to keep in mind
when discussing performance of sales contracts. The primary effort
should be to avoid the application of the codes in litigation or even
the prospect of litigation. This can best be accomplished by dealing
with gentlemen-or at any rate with those who would like to be known
as such. If that is impossible, then one should draft a contract which
makes everything very clear (unless, of course, one is oneself toying
with the notion of being a little ungentlemanly, in which case ambiguity
can be useful). But most important of all, one should arrange things
so that he does not give up his own property until he has hold of that
of the other party.
" By having a negotiable document of title issued, the seller can easily arrange to
retain control of the goods until he receives a credit satisfactory to him. The letter
of credit gives him such a credit upon presentation of proper documents. The
issuing bank (and hence the buyer) can protect itself even where a personal inspec-
tion is impractical by requiring an inspection certificate by some reliable agency in
the seller's country.

